The BRICS and Oil: The Conflict in Iran
In 2023, at the BRICS summit – comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – in Johannesburg, the inclusion of six new members was proposed: Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Ethiopia. Only the last four formally joined the group in 2024. Saudi Arabia remains in a state of uncertainty regarding its membership. On 28 February 2026, following the US and Israeli attack on Iran, the question arises: why did the BRICS not speak out? This article seeks to explain the reasons behind this from a global political economy perspective.
When analysing the new members of BRICS, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia play a central role within OPEC+ and are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The latter country has alternative routes to the Red Sea that partially reduce its dependence on this strategic passage. They are key players in the global oil market. Egypt and Ethiopia are linked by the Nile River's energy issue through the Chinese-funded Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Ethiopia also has one of Africa’s leading airlines, Ethiopian Airlines.
Iran was OPEC’s fourth-largest crude oil producer in 2023 and the world’s third-largest producer of dry natural gas in 2022 , and controls the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global maritime trade.
Statements and the Oil Market.
The BRICS are a heterogeneous group, which gives them a global character marked by power imbalances and, above all, conflicts of interest. The group is neither a political/military alliance nor an integrated economic bloc, as there are no binding agreements among them. As a result, BRICS statements are often deliberately vague and lack direct alignment—a trend reflected in the 2026 conflict in Iran. One factor explaining this fragmentation is the role of its members in the global energy market, particularly in oil.
China has advocated for stability in the Strait of Hormuz. The Red Dragon imports approximately 70% of its oil consumption, mainly by sea (90%), so the closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects it directly. According to the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China: “The remainder (of the oil) arrived by land from Russia, Kazakhstan and Mongolia… via pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan”. This implies that, although China has developed overland pipelines such as the Kazakhstan–China or the Myanmar–China pipelines, these do not replace the flow from the Middle East, meaning that Iran’s attacks on energy infrastructure in neighbouring countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE and Iraq) equally affect China and the global market.
Iran exports more than 80% of its oil to China. According to data from Kpler, China imported more than 5 million barrels of crude oil per day through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025, sourced from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman. That year, Saudi Arabia was its main supplier, supplying 1.5 million barrels per day, and Iran was the second-largest supplier, supplying 1.4 million barrels per day.
Russia has condemned the attacks on Iran. The Kremlin is benefiting from the disruption of the oil market. Between 1 and 15 March2026,it received €7.7 billion from exports of fossil fuels (such as oil, gas and coal), revenue derived from effective export prices against a backdrop of sanctions and disruptions in the global energy market. This equates to around €513 million per day, compared to €472 million in February. A daily difference of €41 million, and if the trend continues, Russia stands to gain an additional €1.2 billion per month and nearly €14.7 billion per year as a result of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The rise in global oil prices resulting from the US and Israeli attacks on 28 February has benefited Russia and allowed it to re-establish itself as a key supplier to Asia. In the first 15 days of March alone, it earned 14% more than its average daily earnings in February.
Saudi Arabia warned Iran to halt the attacks or face retaliation. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates condemned the attacks in the Gulf and strengthened its air defences, aiming to protect regional stability and energy routes. In contrast, Brazil and South Africa adopted cautious stances and focused on dialogue.
India and its restraint
India has called for restraint and dialogue, without issuing any direct condemnation. The country depends on energy imports; about 85% of its oil is sourced from abroad, mainly the Middle East (Iraq, UAE, and Saudi Arabia) and Russia. In this context, India has increased its purchases of Russian crude. Meanwhile, its strategic relationship with the United States is significant for security and Indo-Pacific cooperation through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Additionally, economic integration is growing through the outsourcing of Indian services to US companies, though President Trump’s immigration policies in recent years have affected these flows. Thus, India's energy dependence on the Persian Gulf and Russia reinforces its perception as a pivotal country.
The BRICS’ failure to take a stance on the conflict in Iran shows their heterogeneity and conflicting energy and geopolitical interests. Given these conditions and the lack of binding agreements, it is not easy for the group to issue a statement or take action. This situation also prevents them from entering conflicts with other countries. It allows the group to continue trading without incurring war costs or losing a potential trading partner by showing support.
[1] Faculty of Economics. Member of OBELA.
[2] Dr. Oscar Ugarteche, Dr. José Carlos Díaz, Gabriela Ramírez, Jennifer Montoya, Jesús Córdoba, Nate Chávez
